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I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenal rate of inflation experienced by the health care
industry in the past several years has been a substantial cause of
concern for everyone affected-physicians, hospitals, insurers, em-
ployers and consumers. Public reaction to the tremendous increase
in health care costs has created pressure on health care providers
to compete on the basis of price and to deliver services more effi-
ciently. The recent growth of alternative health care delivery sys-
tems (ADSs) has been a direct response to a number of problems
created by increasing health care costs including increased compe-
tition in health care delivery, resistance by payors and consumers
to spiraling costs, physician surpluses, an oversupply of hospital
beds, and consumer demand for more convenient access to
services.
ADSs can be described generally as any arrangement for health
care delivery or financing that operates on a basis other than the
traditional fee-for-service system. They are designed to control
health care costs by increasing price competition between provid-
ers and encouraging providers to reduce utilization of services. The
formation of an ADS promotes competition among providers to
* Partner, McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1968, Bridgewater Col-
lege; J.D., 1975, University of Virginia.
** Associate, McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1975, University of
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participate in the ADS as well as competition among the ADSs
themselves for purchasers of their services.
ADSs have been structured in several different ways, such as
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), individual practice as-
sociations (IPAs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), exclu-
sive provider organizations and foundations for medical care. The
various types of ADSs share one common characteristic in that
each consists of a limited group of providers which has contracted
to provide comprehensive health care services to groups such as
insurance company policyholders or a business's employees. Alter-
native health care plans not only take different forms but also can
be sponsored by different groups such as health care providers
(physicians and hospitals), purchasers (insurance carriers and self-
insured employers) or brokers (third party administrators and
entrepreneurs).
For example, the now familiar "closed panel" HMO, is a single
entity which provides comprehensive health care services on a pre-
paid basis at a central facility. The services are delivered by prov-
iders who are employed and salaried by the HMO. It is referred to
as a "closed panel" because its physician membership is limited.
The patient-subscriber pays a fixed price in advance of treatment
and is guaranteed complete coverage for all medical needs pro-
vided that he uses the HMO's providers. As a result, the HMO
undertakes a financial risk: if the premiums or fees prospectively
collected by the HMO fail to cover the cost of the services ren-
dered, the HMO must absorb the loss. This gives the provider an
incentive to operate efficiently and reduce utilization of services.
Another type of HMO-the IPA, provides services at the offices
of its member-physicians. Physicians are usually reimbursed on a
fee-for-service basis up to a limit negotiated between the IPA and
the individual physicians. Accordingly, it is often referred to as a
"fee-for-service HMO." IPA-type HMOs generally involve two sep-
arate entities: the HMO and the IPA. The HMO operates and ad-
ministers the prepaid benefits segment of the plan while the IPA
provides physician services to the HMO through a service agree-
ment. The IPA also separately contracts with individual physicians
to deliver services to HMO enrollees. As part of the contract the
IPA agrees in advance with its physicians on fees and utilization
control procedures. These agreements often are subject to risk
sharing arrangements whereby the IPA retains a certain percent-
age of each physician's fee to pay for costs arising from utilization
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of medical services above a projected rate. If the utilization of
medical services by the HMO enrollees falls at or below the pro-
jected rate, the HMO typically distributes incentive payments to
the IPA. If not, the IPA indemnifies the HMO for excess
utilization.
A PPO, by contrast, is a health care delivery model under which
designated physicians, hospitals or other providers contract their
services to a defined group of patients on a predetermined fee-for-
service basis. These patients usually are the beneficiaries of health
care plans provided by employers, insurance carriers or union trust
funds. Although PPOs can vary considerably in their organization,
most have the following characteristics:
1. A designated panel of preferred providers that may include
physicians, hospitals or both;
2. The marketing of the services of the panel to employers, in-
surers, unions or individuals;
3. A negotiated payment modality for providers which can be on
a fee-for-service or relative value scale basis, including discounts
ranging from five to twenty percent, but may also include per diem
rates, diagnostic related grouping (DRG) payments and true
capitation;
4. Providers charge reduced rates in exchange for anticipated in-
creased patient volume and prompt, guaranteed claims payment;
5. Economic incentives for patients to use panel providers, such
as the elimination or reduction of co-payments and/or deductibles;
6. Controls on utilization of services including retrospective re-
view on a spot basis, comprehensive concurrent review and prior
authorization.
In theory, everyone involved in an ADS can benefit. For provid-
ers, an ADS offers the opportunity for a steady and increased pa-
tient load, more rapid claims processing and reduced administra-
tive costs. Sponsoring an ADS may also offer individual providers
the opportunity to maintain the independence of their practice.
For purchasers, utilization and peer review procedures common to
many ADSs could be the most effective tools for reducing health
care costs. The use of a data collection system allows the purchaser
and the ADS to evaluate the performance of the plan and make
appropriate adjustments. A purchaser also may realize cost savings
from the negotiation of a fee schedule in advance of treatment. Fi-
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nally, a patient may save money through the elimination or reduc-
tion of co-payments and/or deductibles if plan providers are used.
Despite the potential procompetitive benefits, the formation and
operation of many types of ADSs present several significant anti-
trust problems, particularly if providers sponsor or control the
ADS. The less the actual integration of practice, the greater the
problem is likely to be.' For example, many of the currently popu-
lar PPOs consist of loose amalgamations of otherwise independent
physicians, hospitals and other providers. This article examines
questions raised by provider-sponsored ADSs and sets forth rec-
ommendations for reducing the antitrust risks.
II. APPLICATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO ADSs
The antitrust laws primarily applicable to alternative health care
plans are the Sherman Antitrust Act 2 and its state law counter-
parts.' Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes unlawful contracts,
combinations, agreements and understandings which unreasonably
restrain trade in interstate commerce. State antitrust laws gener-
ally parallel the federal statute and reach similar conduct on an
intrastate level. There is no longer any doubt that the antitrust
laws apply to the professions generally, and to health care delivery
systems specifically.4
A critical factor in analyzing any ADS under the antitrust laws is
its structure. As indicated earlier, an ADS can be sponsored and
organized by brokers, purchasers or providers. The selection of a
particular organizational format has significant antitrust implica-
tions. A broker-sponsored ADS, for example, is generally charac-
terized by the lack of any direct or indirect control or interest in
the plan by health care providers and third-party payors. The ADS
essentially acts as an intermediary between providers selling their
services and purchasers buying such services for their insureds or
employees. A broker-sponsored ADS should pass antitrust muster
as long as it does not serve merely as a facilitator for price fixing,
boycott or other anticompetitive behavior, and there are no agree-
ments between either competing providers or payors concerning
1. For discussion of integration of practice, see infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
3. See, e.g., Virginia Antitrust Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
4. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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any aspect of their involvement in the plan.'
Similarly, a purchaser-sponsored ADS is usually organized by an
entity, such as a self-insured employer, insurance company or
union trust fund, that pays for health care services or represents
employees needing these services. A purchaser-based ADS should
be viewed as a vertical arrangement between buyers and sellers. It
should be lawful under the antitrust laws provided that it does not
enter into horizontal agreements with other health care purchasers
or participate in anticompetitive agreements among competing
providers.
On the other hand, a provider-sponsored ADS, in which physi-
cians and/or hospitals join together to market their services to
third-party purchasers, creates several antitrust concerns. This is
because a provider-sponsored ADS is made up of competing prov-
iders and the ADS will, by necessity, make decisions regarding
fees, provider membership and utilization review that directly af-
fect these competitors. The two principal antitrust issues raised by
a provider-sponsored ADS involve' the potential for price fixing
5. See Letter from William F. Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Dep't Justice, to Dr. Irwin S. Smith (Sept. 21, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust
Letter-Smith] (Although the Department of Justice is not authorized to give advisory
opinions to private parties, the Antitrust Division will in certain circumstances review an
organization's proposed business conduct and state its enforcement intentions under the
federal antitrust laws. 28 C.FR § 50.6 (1984)); Federal Trade Commission Advisory Opinion
to Health Care Management Associates (June 7, 1983) [hereinafter cited as FTC Advisory
Opinion-HCMA]; cf. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624
F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding joint policy by two plans to refuse to pay for services
rendered by clinical psychologists unless billed through physicians to be a restraint of
trade), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
6. The formation and operation of an ADS may present other antitrust questions which
should be less prevalent than price fixing and group boycott issues. For example, if the ADS
prevents member-providers from participating in other alternative health care plans, the
ADS may be charged with entering into an exclusive dealing contract in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), or § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). An
exclusive dealing arrangement is unlawful if it results in a substantial foreclosure of compe-
tition in the relevant market. Cf. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320
(1961) (exclusive dealing contract did not violate § 3 of the Clayton Act when performance
would not have foreclosed competition); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949) (exclusive dealing contract tending to foreclose competition held in violation of § 3 of
the Clayton Act). In analyzing the legality of an exclusive dealing arrangement, a court will
define the effective area of competition, examine the market shares of the ADS and the
other parties involved, and ascertain the alternatives available for other providers and
health care plans. The definition of the relevant market will be a difficult issue in these
cases because a reasonable argument can be made that the relevant market consists of all
competing physicians and practice groups, rather than just competing ADSs. As a general
matter, exclusivity provisions should not raise serious antitrust concerns where the market
share of the ADS is small. An ADS may be charged with possessing monopoly power or
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among participating providers in establishing their fees and claims
by providers not allowed to participate in the ADS that the partic-
ipating providers have engaged in a group boycott or concerted re-
fusal to deal with them.7
A. Potential Price Fixing Liability
The antitrust issue most frequently raised when analyzing a pro-
vider-sponsored ADS is the claim that the participating providers
are engaged in illegal price fixing.8 The setting of price by competi-
tors, whether by agreement to charge a uniform price, or by em-
ploying uniform discounts or similar formulas, is per se unlawful
attempting to monopolize the market in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
The definition of the relevant market also is critical for these antitrust offenses, and it is
unlikely in most jurisdictions that a violation will be found absent a substantial market
share.
7. Price fixing and group boycott problems usually do not arise in a provider-based HMO
where the participating providers are salaried employees of the HMO or are part of an inte-
grated medical group which contracts to provide services to the HMO for a fixed amount. In
these situations, the HMO is viewed as a single business entity rather than a collection of
competing providers. Therefore, these types of provider-based ADSs are not included within
the scope of this article.
8. Some traditional defenses may be available to exempt the activities of an ADS from
antitrust liability. For example, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982),
exempts from application of the federal antiturst laws the "business of insurance" to the
extent such business is regulated by state law, provided that its activities do not constitute a
boycott, coercion or intimidation. It may be possible to structure an ADS in such a way that
participating providers sufficiently spread the risks of operating to constitute the "business
of insurance." However, several courts have recently determined that cost control devices,
participating provider agreements, and agreements among competing physicians cannot
qualify for exemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v.
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205
(1979); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981). But see Klamath Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v.
Klamath Medical Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S.
Ct. 88 (1983).
It also may be possible to immunize an ADS's activities on the basis of the Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), state action exemption. A practice may be immune from anti-
trust liability under the state action doctrine if it embodies a clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed state policy to displace competition and is actively supervised by the state
itself. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisianna Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410
(1978)). The state action doctrine, however, probably will not immunize an ADS unless its
provision for competing providers to determine fees and membership is clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy by the state statutes which provide for the estab-
lishment and licensing of health care plans. These arguments have not met with a great deal
of success. See Ratino v. Medical Serv. of D.C., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,641 (4th Cir.
1983); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists, 624 F.2d 476.
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under section 1 of the Sherman Act.9
By a vote of four to three, the Supreme Court in Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Society0 held that it was a per se viola-
tion of section 1 for physician members of a foundation for medical
care to agree to accept no more than set maximum prices in full
payment for medical services rendered to policyholders of specified
insurance plans. The foundation for medical care was a non-profit
corporation comprised of about seventy percent of the licensed
physicians in the area." These physicians provided services on a
fee-for-service basis for insurance plans approved by the founda-
tion. The foundation was formed by county medical societies for
the purpose of promoting fee-for-service medicine, and to offer a
competitive alternative to existing health insurance plans, HMOs
and other forms of health care delivery systems. The key functions
of the foundation were to (1) establish a schedule of maximum fees
that participating physicians would agree to accept as payment in
full for services performed for patients insured by plans approved
by the foundation, (2) review the medical necessity and appropri-
ateness of treatment provided to such patients, and (3) reimburse
physicians for services from insurance company accounts. The
maximum fees to be paid by insurers were set by a vote of the
participating physicians.'
2
The State of Arizona charged the medical societies and founda-
tion with engaging in an illegal price fixing conspiracy. 3 In its de-
fense, the medical societies made four principal arguments, assert-
ing that the foundation offered customers a desirable form of
health delivery, that the challenged agreement actually lowered
fees, that the foundation was a joint venture rather than a horizon-
tal combination, and that the rule of reason, rather than the per se
9. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222-23 (1940). There are two
standards for determining the legality of conduct challenged under the antitrust laws. The
basic standard of review is the "rule of reason" under which the reasonableness of the chal-
lenged conduct is measured by determining whether, in the circumstances taken as a whole,
the procompetitive benefits of the conduct outweigh any anticompetitive effects. Certain
restraints, however, such as price fixing, group boycotts and horizontal market divisions, are
conclusively presumed unreasonable and, regardless of any business justification, are per se
illegal. The Supreme Court has criticized the indiscriminate use of the per se rule. See
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1979); Continen-
tal T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-59 (1977).
10. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
11. Id. at 339.
12. Id. at 339-42.
13. Id. at 336.
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rule, should apply to the maximum price fixing agreement. 4
The Supreme Court held that the arrangement constituted an
agreement among competitors to fix maximum prices and therefore
was per se illegal. The Court made it clear that the long standing
application of the rule against price fixing by competitors was so
well established that there was no leeway to apply a different rule
to the health care industry or health professionals. 15 The type of
practice involved, i.e., price fixing, rather than the industry in
which it appeared, determined whether a per se rule or a rule of
reason analysis was proper.' The Court concluded that price fixing
agreements must be avoided at all cost, without analysis of any
purported procompetitive justifications or other cost containment
objectives. 17
In response to the foundation's arguments, the Court explained
that the insurance companies individually, rather than the physi-
cians, could have established the fees, that the lower prices did not
justify elimination of competition, and that the practices of the
physician members were not sufficiently iitegrated to constitute a
joint venture to which the rule of reason might apply. 8
An important element of the Court's reasoning was the fact that
there was a less restrictive alternative available to implement the
foundation's health insurance plan and its desire to cap the
amount of physician reimbursement. The health insurers, which
had no incentive to fix above-competitive fees, could have unilater-
ally set the maximum reimbursement. Thus, it was not necessary
for the doctors to do the price fixing.' 9
The Maricopa decision is significant because of its direct and
mechanical approach to price fixing, and the Court's unwillingness
to grant special consideration to the health care industry or health
care professionals. The Court ruled in no uncertain terms that (1)
agreements among competitors to fix maximum prices do not es-
cape per se condemnation, (2) the fact that physicians rather than
non-professionals were parties to the price fixing agreement did
not preclude application of the per se rule, (3) the judiciary's lack
14. Id. at 342, 351.
15. Id. at 348-50.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 349.
18. Id. at 351-54.
19. Id. at 352-53.
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of antitrust experience in the health care industry was no reason
for not applying the per se rule, and (4) the per se rule was appli-
cable even if the agreement had procompetitive justifications.
Maricopa essentially proclaims that per se rules can apply when
joint activity of competing providers is involved, regardless of the
economic efficiency or cost containment justifications. While not
precluding provider sponsorship of ADSs, Maricopa at least cau-
tions that a provider-sponsored ADS must be carefully planned
and structured if antitrust problems are to be avoided.
B. Methods for Avoiding Price Fixing Problems
1. Use of an Independent Management Entity
One of the key variables used in determining whether an ADS
will have a price fixing problem is how its fees are established. A
provider controlled, sponsored and operated ADS presents the
highest potential of antitrust liability and is extremely suspect af-
ter Maricopa because of the danger that its activities will be con-
sidered concerted action. A health care plan that is controlled by a
group of competing physicians is treated as the agent of the physi-
cian group; its plans, practices and policies are scrutinized under
the antitrust laws as concerted activity.20
Provider control of a health plan may be found in a variety of
circumstances. For example, in Virginia Academy of Clinical Psy-
chologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia,2 the Fourth Circuit found
the Blue Shield plan to be under physician control because of the
presence of a number of factors. The state Medical Society had in
the past sponsored Blue Shield and nominated a majority of its
physician board members, the physicians constituted a majority of
the board and participating physicians were members of the plan.22
This analysis followed that of United States v. Sealy, Inc.,23 where
the Supreme Court found that the conduct of Sealy, Inc. was actu-
ally concerted action by the independent competitors controlling
the company. Sealy was jointly owned by a group of independent
mattress manufacturers to do national marketing and to license
20. Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Va., 624 F.2d 476 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
21. Id.
22. See id., 624 F. 2d at 480.
23. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
1985] 215
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the Sealy trademark. 4 The licensee-manufacturers owned ninety-
eight percent of Sealy stock, were represented on eleven of the
fourteen seats of the board of directors and held positions on the
firm's Executive Committee.25 Even after the board structure was
changed so that six of the seven Sealy board members were outside
directors with no affiliation with any of the independent business-
licensees of Sealy, a federal court held that a jury might still find
control vested in the licensees:
Although six of the seven directors have no past affiliation with
Sealy, it is not clear that the licensees exercised no influence or con-
trol over the board. One of the board members is the president of
Sealy; a relevant fact will be the degree of influence he holds over
the outside directors. Moreover, it is the Sealy licensees, who own
more than 90 percent of Sealy's shares, that elect the "independent"
directors. It would not be unreasonable for a jury to find that Sealy's
new board of directors is not as independent as Sealy suggests.26
Other possible methods of "control" include participating con-
tracts with voting rights, the original selection of a board of direc-
tors and management with a self-perpetuating board, and veto
rights over new applicants for membership.2"
Although a provider-controlled ADS is likely to be viewed as a
combination of its participating providers, it may be able to estab-
lish its fee structure through independent management. This can
be accomplished in a number of ways such as by (1) appointing a
third party administrator to manage and operate the ADS, includ-
ing the negotiating and setting of its fee, (2) retaining a person or
group for the specific purpose of setting the fees, (3) establishing a
committee of non-providers to determine the fee structure, or (4)
having a sponsoring insurance company or employer set the reim-
bursement schedule. Whichever entity is selected to manage the
ADS, it should be separate and distinct from the participating
providers, and the providers should not control the fee setting
mechanism. Specifically, the providers should not have access to
fee information of their competitors and should not participate in
24. Id. at 351.
25. Id. at 352.
26. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Duncan, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,307, at 75,603
(N.D. Ill. 1980); see also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
27. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 602; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 9-
11 (1945).
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the review of fees or discounts offered by contracting providers. In
addition, the board of directors of the ADS should be composed of
non-providers. Participating providers could serve on an advisory
council, but the board of directors should have the final authority
over policy decisions such as the fee structure and utilization con-
trol procedures.
This does not mean, however, that provider input is completely
prohibited. Input by providers to independent management often
will be necessary, procompetitive and entirely lawful. 28 In fact, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has ruled that a group of com-
peting providers may comment on a third party payor's reimburse-
ment policy so long as it does not authorize a common agent to
negotiate with the payor on their mutual behalf.29 Nevertheless, in
practice such input can be dangerous because it supplies the fac-
tual underpinnings from which a court or jury might infer a combi-
nation or conspiracy leading to a section 1 violation. Therefore, it
is important to be able to objectively verify that all final policy
decisions, especially those relating to fees, are made independently
by the ADS's managing entity.
Price fixing problems should be minimized if the entity manag-
ing the ADS meets with individual providers and negotiates with
each a discount from that provider's usual and customary fees, or
unilaterally establishes fees or discounts from usual fees. In the ab-
sence of provider participation or influence, courts will not treat
individual bilateral contracts between a buyer, the ADS, and a
seller, the physician, as per se illegal price fixing because such
agreements do not involve sales to third parties but are merely ar-
rangements for the purchase of goods and services. Such arrange-
ments should be evaluated under the "rule of reason" and gener-
ally will be upheld because of their procompetitive effects.3 '
28. Cf. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1470-71 (1984) (commu-
nications between manufacturers and distributors regarding competitors' prices deemed
necessary in an efficient distribution system; such communications alone are not concerted
action); Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,575 (8th Cir. 1982);
Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 911 (1981).
29. See Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 44 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 426, 443
(Feb. 24, 1983).
30. See Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. at 1471; Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 1982-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 64,576 (8th Cir. 1982).
31. See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 214 (1979);
Sausalito Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Shield of Cal., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 64,766 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue
1985] 217
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The U.S. Department of Justice and the FTC recently advised
two groups who were forming PPOs that they would have no price
fixing problems since provider reimbursement would be deter-
mined by the PPO's independent organizer-administrator, rather
than by the providers themselves.32 The first group, Health Care
Management Associates (HCMA), intended to create a PPO, with
HCMA acting as its marketing and administrative arm. The PPO
would contract with doctors and other licensed health care provid-
ers, and with third-party payors, such as insurance companies and
self-insured employers, concerning the terms for the provision of
health care services to patients. HCMA would not be affiliated
with any providers, but would contract with participating provid-
ers on their method of payment. Patients whose insurers had con-
tracted with the PPO would receive treatment from participating
providers at charges less than their usual fees. The contracting
providers would not vote on or collectively influence the fee levels.
The PPO would not be involved in an individual physician's fee
setting and the fee discounts would be individually negotiated with
the physicians. Furthermore, HCMA would not disseminate cur-
rent fee information among the participating physicians but only
to the third-party payors.
Although the Justice Department recognized that the PPO is an
organization composed of competing providers and thus could pre-
sent antitrust concerns, it concluded that HCMA's proposed PPO
was not likely to cause competitive problems. The Department rea-
soned that, given the use of individually negotiated discounts from
customary fees and safeguards against the exchange of fee infor-
mation among providers, the operation of the PPO was not likely
to either facilitate collusive behavior among providers or eliminate
effective competition in the area. Furthermore, the Justice Depart-
ment observed that the emergence of PPOs can benefit the public
by increasing competition among providers, stimulating cost con-
tainment efforts and contributing to lower health care costs.33
Cross and Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 675 F.2d 502, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1982); Proctor v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 337 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 (1982);
General Glass Co. v. Globe Glass & Trim Co., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,531 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
32. See Antitrust Letter-Smith, supra note 5; Letter from William F. Baxter, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't Justice, to Donald W. Fish, Esq. (Sept. 21,
1983) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Letter-Fish].
33. Antitrust Letter-Smith, supra note 5, at 4. In a March 22, 1985 speech, J. Paul Mc-
Grath, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, stated
that provider-sponsored PPOs generally provide significant procompetitive benefits and rec-
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Like the Justice Department, the FTC found that HCMA's PPO
was procompetitive and would not violate the antitrust laws.3 4 Ac-
cording to the Commission, the PPO would be a vertical arrange-
ment between individual sellers (participating providers) and pur-
chasers (third-party payors, acting on behalf of their insureds or
beneficiaries) for the sale and purchase of health care services.
HCMA would facilitate these transactions by performing certain
functions much like an agent or broker. In addition, the PPO did
not involve any agreements among competing providers concerning
any aspect of their involvement in the program. As a result, the
FTC ruled that the operation of the program would not constitute
either a horizontal or vertical price fixing arrangement, or an un-
lawful joint sales agency arrangement.3 5
Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) also obtained business
review letter approval from the Department of Justice for a PPO
in two Florida counties.3 6 HCA proposed to create a subsidiary,
MSA, which would develop and market a PPO in the area. MSA
would enter into contracts with doctors and other medical services
providers, hospitals and third-party payors (such as insurance
companies and self-insured employers), under which patients
would receive treatment from contracting providers and hospitals
at reduced rates. MSA would individually negotiate the amount of
the discount offered by each affiliated doctor and hospital. As a
result, the size of the discount and the resulting fee could vary
among different providers and hospitals. Participating providers
would be free to lower their discounted fees or to change their
usual and customary fees at any time, but would agree not to raise
their discounted fees for one year from the execution of a contract
with MSA. MSA would have a local advisory board of trustees
composed of contracting providers, representatives of contracting
hospitals and third-party payors. However, the provider members
of the board would not have access to confidential fee information
concerning their competitors, and the board would not review the
fees or discounts offered by contracting providers. Final authority
for pricing, membership and other policy decisions would reside
with MSA's executive director and board of directors. Given these
ommended that regulatory barriers to the formation of competitive PPOs be removed.
Speech by J. Paul McGrath, to the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association Meet-
ing (Mar. 22, 1985) [hereinafter cited as McGrath Speech].
34. See FTC Advisory Opinion-HCMA, supra note 5, at 145.
35. Id.
36. See Antitrust Letter-Fish, supra note 32.
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facts, the Justice Department recognized that, while the proposed
PPO would be an organization composed of competing providers, it
would still have procompetitive effects and was not likely to cause
competitive problems.3 7
As noted previously, Maricopa teaches that a provider-con-
trolled ADS which sets the compensation of its competing provid-
ers is likely to constitute horizontal price-fixing. 8 However, as the
above examples illustrate, the determination of the standard price
for a group of competing providers by independent, bilateral con-
tracts with a third-party management entity, which is not con-
trolled by the providers, has been upheld. Thus, a provider-spon-
sored ADS may be able to avoid horizontal price-fixing by
employing a truly independent manager or administrator to estab-
lish the fee structure and enter into individual agreements with the
participating providers. 9
2. Integration of Practices and Establishment of Joint Venture
The Supreme Court in Maricopa suggested that one method by
which a health care plan may avoid price fixing liability is to par-
tially integrate the activities of the participating providers and cre-
ate a joint venture. If the providers can sufficiently integrate their
practices and form a legitimate joint venture, their agreement re-
garding fees may then be tested under the rule of reason analysis.
In Maricopa, the Court drew a distinction between the founda-
tion for medical care and "partnerships or other joint arrange-
ments in which persons who would otherwise be competitors pool
their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities
for profit."40 The Court explained that "[i]n such joint ventures,
the partnership is regarded as a single firm competing with other
sellers in the market."41 Thus, Maricopa suggests that the rule of
reason could be applied to the fee setting process where providers
37. Id.
38. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
39. The manager or administrator must be truly independent of the provider-based ADS.
If the manager is in reality directed or controlled by the participating providers, a court
most likely will "pierce the veil" to find that the manager is merely a joint sales agent for
the providers. The providers could then be held individually liable for price fixing viola-
tions. It is therefore important to recognize that the determination of the independence of
the ADS's manager will be based upon a factual test.
40. 457 U.S. at 356.
41. Id.
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form a partially integrated ADS and/or share the financial risks
associated with the ADS. Unfortunately, the Court provided little
guidance for determining when the provider members of an ADS
have sufficiently integrated their practice to avoid the per se rule.
As a result, reliance upon the unrefined language in Maricopa re-
garding the organization of an ADS as a joint venture entails a
degree of risk that the fee setting mechanism of the ADS will be
challenged under the antitrust laws. Nevertheless, these risks may
be worth taking if direct provider control is important to the ADS
organizers.
Integration generally is defined as the coordination or joining to-
gether of functions such as production, management, promotion,
distribution, financing and debt collection. A partially integrated
plan results when the controlling providers still compete with each
other for patients in independent medical practices and have ei-
ther partially integrated their practices into the plan or made a
substantial financial contribution to support the establishment or
operation of the plan.42 A plan may be partially integrated by cen-
tralization of marketing, billing and debt collecting functions, or by
sharing the potential financial risks resulting from unanticipated
high costs or utilization.4 The financial contribution may be in the
form of a capital contribution by the group or may entail an indi-
rect financial contribution to the plan's operation through a risk-
sharing arrangement.44 Risk-sharing might be achieved by retain-
ing some portion of the fees payable to participating providers and
distributing them to the providers only if a certain factor, such as
reduction in individual patient utilization, were achieved. If this
factor were not achieved, the retained fees could be distributed to
the payors.45
Where the providers of an ADS are able to centralize some of
their functions so as to clearly achieve efficiencies and a sharing of
the risks of operation, courts may be willing to treat the ADS as a
joint venture to which the rule of reason applies. As one commen-
tator has observed, however, "[o]nly those joint ventures where
there is substantial but not complete integration of production,
managerial, distribution, financial or other operations will be con-
42. See FTC Policy Statement on Physician Agreements to Control Medical Prepayment
Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,982, 48,989 (1981) [hereinafter cited as FTC Policy Statement].
43. Id. at 48,989 n.44.
44. Id. at n.41.
45. See id. at 48,989.
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sidered. Without such integration, the 'joint venture' label simply
masks a consensual cartel, and there is no reason to displace estab-
lished antitrust rules governing cartel conduct. ' 46 Nevertheless, the
rule of reason should be the appropriate standard for determining
the validity of partially integrated health care plans if a new en-
tity, with the potential to enhance competition, has been created.47
A joint venture is normally considered lawful if: (1) any elimina-
tion of price competition between the participants results directly
from the partial integration of their functions, i.e., the agreement
fixing prices is a necessary part of the joint venture and is no
broader than necessary for that purpose; (2) the market share of
the participants as a group is small; and (3) the parties have not
demonstrated a primary purpose or intent to restrict or eliminate
competition.48
In November, 1983, the Ohio Attorney General issued an advi-
sory opinion concluding that PPOs should be analyzed under the
rule of reason as joint ventures. 49 The Ohio Attorney General rea-
soned that a PPO's price setting function should not be subject to
the per se rule because it is ancillary to the creation of a new com-
petitive entity, the PPO.
Physicians or hospitals who combine to form a PPO do much more
than fix prices; they pool their capital and undertake the risks asso-
ciated with the establishment of a new method for marketing their
services. The integration of marketing, claims administration, billing
and other functions warrants the conclusion that the resultant price
restraint is ancillary in nature.50
Furthermore, the Ohio Attorney General noted that price re-
straints associated with a provider-sponsored PPO are generally no
greater than necessary to achieve legitimate business purposes. As
a competitor in the market for prepaid health care, a PPO must
46. Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the Signifi-
cance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1007, 1016 (1969).
47. See FTC Policy Statement, supra note 42, at 48,989.
48. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 279 (1978); L. SuLLivAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST 206 (1977); Weller, The Antitrust Swamp: How Can Health Care Profes-
sionals Avoid It?, HEALTH CARE FIN. MGMT. 26, 28 (1982). On March 22, 1985, the Depart-
ment of Justice's Antitrust Division announced that it would normally analyze provider-
sponsored PPOs under joint venture principles and would apply this three-part test to de-
termine its legality. McGrath Speech, supra note 33.
49. OP. OHIO A'r'y GEN., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,796 (Nov. 17, 1983).
50. Id. at 67,308.
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set the price at which it will deal with providers. In order to attract
customers away from traditional insurers, the PPO usually must
use discounts. Since this fee setting activity of a provider-based
PPO is necessary for its successful operation, the Ohio Attorney
General concluded that it should be judged under the rule of rea-
son rather than summarily condemned under the per se rule.5'
The Attorney General's opinion then analyzed typical provider-
based PPOs under the rule of reason and declared that PPOs will
usually promote, not restrain, competition by creating .an incentive
for providers to deliver efficient, quality patient care. When the
PPO enters the marketplace, rational incentives for efficiency are
restored in that consumers are encouraged, through the use of
smaller copayments and deductibles, to use efficient providers. Ef-
ficient providers are rewarded by being assured a steady stream of
patients. This, in turn, creates the incentive for other providers to
form competing PPOs.5
The Ohio Attorney General also observed, however,that PPOs
will promote competition only so long as they do not possess undue
market power. If too high a percentage of a community's providers
are members, the PPO may become a monopoly, and the resulting
suppression of competition will outweigh any procompetitive bene-
fits.5 3 On similar grounds, the FTC has warned that, while prepaid
health care plans have the potential to enhance competition in the
health care services market, antitrust concerns can arise under sev-
eral circumstances, such as when a relatively large number of phy-
sicians join together to control a plan, or when a controlled plan
has market power, or when a physician group of any size forms or
operates a plan to effectuate an anticompetitive purpose. The FTC
51. Id.
52. Id. at 67,308-09.
53. Id. Unfortunately, there are no established rules on the maximum combined market
share of participating providers that the antitrust laws will allow. One commentator has
suggested that a joint venture should be presumptively unlawful if it is controlled by fifteen
percent or more of the local hospitals or physicians, or both. See Brodley, Joint Ventures
and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1553 (1982). However, another antitrust ana-
lyst would draw the line at forty percent. See R. BORK, supra note 40, at 222, 279. In
addition, the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division relied on a maximum of twenty
percent of available providers as a factor in its favorable review of a PPO proposal. See
Antitrust Letter-Smith, supra note 5. More recently, the Antitrust Division indicated that
it would likely have no reason to challenge the size of a provider-sponsored PPO with less
than twenty percent of the market and would apply a market-specific analysis to each case
in which the size of the PPO exceeds twenty percent of the market. McGrath Speech, supra
note 33.
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noted that anticompetitive purposes, such as stabilizing physicians'
fees or creating a plan that will dominate the market and exercise
market power for the benefit of a group of physicians, may create
the basis for challenging a partially integrated health care plan.
The FTC also may challenge a plan if it unreasonably injures com-
peting providers or plans. 54
More recently, the FTC approved the operations of a large
HMO/IPA plan in Michigan whose enrollees comprise approxi-
mately twelve percent of the population of a three-county service
area.55 The HMO contracted wth an IPA professional corporation,
which included approximately sixty percent of the primary care
physicians and sixty-five percent of the total number of physicians
practicing in the area, for the purpose of providing medical ser-
vices to the enrollees. The HMO charged enrollees a monthly pre-
mium and paid the IPA on a capitation basis. However, the physi-
cian-shareholders of the IPA were paid on a fee-for-service basis.
The IPA used a fee schedule to determine the amount paid to phy-
sician-shareholders, who were paid the lesser of their actual
charges or the fee schedule amount. In addition, a percentage of
the fee due to the physicians was withheld by the IPA and placed
in a special risk-sharing account. In the event that the HMO's cap-
itation payments were not sufficient to pay for the medical services
delivered by the IPA, the risk-sharing account was drawn upon for
any deficit. Furthermore, the HMO and IPA had a risk-sharing ar-
rangement in which they shared fifty percent of any deficit or sur-
plus that resulted from the provision of health services other than
medical services to the HMO's enrollees. Finally, the HMO and
IPA annually negotiated the capitation payments made by the
HMO and jointly budgeted and anticipated utilization and cost
levels for health services other than the medical services provided
by the IPA.5 6
As a general matter, the FTC stated that health care plans in
which physicians partially integrate their practices, either through
a financial contribution or by a risk-sharing agreement, are scruti-
nized under the rule of reason. Such partially integrated plans are
distinguishable from the types of arrangements held to be per se
54. See FTC Policy Statement, supra note 42, at 48,991-92.
55. Letter from Arthur N. Lerner, Asst. Director, FTC Bureau of Competition, to Gilbert
M. Frimet, Esq. (Mar. 22, 1984) [hereinfter cited as FTC Letter-Frimet].
56. Id. at 3.
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illegal in Maricopa.5 7 The FTC advised the IPA that its use of a
fee schedule for distribution of its capitation payment to its physi-
cians did not appear to violate the antitrust laws, assuming that
the physicians' joint participation in the HMO's program through
the IPA was lawful. Here, the FTC found that the IPA physicians
had a clear financial involvement in the HMO's operation because,
in part, they had assumed a substantial risk by accepting a capita-
tion payment from the HMO. In such a situation, the agreements
on price by the IPA physicians relating to their participation in the
HMO-both in setting maximum allowable fees for services pro-
vided to HMO patients and in collectively negotiating a capitation
rate with the HMO-do not violate the antitrust laws unless they
had, or were likely to have a significant anticompetitive effect.
The FTC did not find any significant anticompetitive effect aris-
ing from the IPA's adoption of a maximum fee schedule for its
physicians and their treatment of HMO patients. The FTC noted
that a fee schedule is a vehicle for determining how revenues will
be distributed within the IPA, just as any business organization
must determine how its revenues will be distributed .5 As a result,
the use of a fee schedule to determine the division of the capita-
tion payment does not in itself present an antitrust problem. The
FTC also indicated that the analysis of the legality of the IPA's fee
schedule probably would not change if the number of physicians
participating in the HMO grew.
The FTC explained that an antitrust problem could exist with
regard to the joint negotiation and agreement by EPA physicians
on the capitation rate they would accept from an HMO. This prob-
lem would arise if the IPA physicians did not have a financial or
risk-sharing interest in the HMO. Such activity would violate the
antitrust laws unless it is part of a true joint venture and its an-
ticompetitive aspects are outweighed by its procompetitive bene-
fits. In this instance, the FTC concluded that the establishment of
a maximum fee schedule by the IPA was not unlawful so long as
the physicians had made a substantial contribution to the opera-
tion of the plan or had undertaken a Substantial financial risk. In
sum, the FTC approved the fee setting activity of an IPA involving
sixty-five percent of the physicians in a service area because the
physicians had formed a legitimate joint venture through their use
57. Id.
58. Id.
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of a risk-sharing arrangement.
In summary, a provider-sponsored ADS may be able to avoid
price fixing liability by sufficiently integrating the practices of its
participating physicians and entering into an arrangement which
spreads the risk of financial loss among the physicians. If this can
be accomplished, the ADS probably will be treated as a joint ven-
ture and thus evaluated under the rule of reason. Under the rule of
reason analysis, the setting of fees by the ADS should be upheld as
long as it is needed to market the plan to third-party payors, the
market share of the participating providers is not substantial, and
the purpose of the activity is not to decrease competition from
other providers.
C. Group Boycotts
The other major area of potential antitrust liability for a pro-
vider-sponsored ADS lies in the concept of group boycotts or con-
certed refusals to deal. Providers excluded from an ADS may be
distressed if it appears that the ADS confers significant financial
benefits on participating providers. As a result, they may claim
that participating providers have engaged in a concerted refusal to
deal with them in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Although the exclusion of providers from a health care plan was
not an issue in Maricopa, a broad reading of that case raises the
specter that this form of conduct will be subject to per se treat-
ment.5 9 What is clear from Maricopa is that joint action by com-
peting physicians will be extremely suspect. Since the Supreme
Court has held in earlier cases that group boycotts in other indus-
tries are per se violations of the antitrust laws, e0 Maricopa suggests
that the same rule will be extended to the health care industry.
Nevertheless, it is unclear exactly what type of concerted action
will constitute a group boycott. While adopting a broad definition
of boycotts, the Supreme Court also has noted that "boycotts are
not a unitary phenomenon." '61 In the health care field, as in other
areas, some courts have tended to define group boycotts by
59. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
60. See, e.g., Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (finding an
agreement between manufacturers and large retail chain to sell to small independent appli-
ance store at discriminatory prices to be a group boycott).
61. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 543 (1978) (quoting P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 381 (2d ed. 1974)).
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whether their purpose or effect is to diminish competition. In such
cases, the courts apply a rule of reason analysis to alleged group
boycotts where there is no exclusionary effect or intent.2 This
backdoor approach to introducing rule of reason analysis into the
group boycott area may be particularly appropriate where quality
of care issues arise. Such a situation may exist when a physician
has been excluded from an ADS because he or she had rendered
inappropriate or unnecessary services. However, for planning pur-
poses it is difficult to rely on the possibility that a court will not
mechanically apply the per se rule to a situation where some prov-
iders have been excluded by a group of competing providers, espe-
cially in view of the Maricopa decision.
Under the antitrust laws, it takes little to. establish "concerted
action" sufficient to prove a violation of section 1; neither a written
nor even express oral agreement is required. Rather, an inference
of concerted action can be raised by a set of circumstances, such as
casual meetings or conversations followed by implementation of
the challenged conduct.6 3 As one court has noted, "[a] knowing
wink can mean more than words."64
As indicated in the discussion on price fixing,6 5 a provider-spon-
sored or controlled ADS presents antitrust problems because of the
danger that it will be treated as a combination bf competing prov-
iders. The factors that are indicative of provider control have al-
ready been discussed66 and will not be repeated here.
Even in the absence of actual control, antitrust courts have fre-
quently found that a single business enterprise's refusal to deal
was not "unilateral" in nature but the result of a combination or
conspiracy. In United States v. General Motors Corp.,67 for exam-
ple, Los Angeles Chevrolet dealers complained to General Motors
about sales by some Chevrolet dealers to discount houses.6 " These
discount houses competed with Chevrolet dealers for new car sales
in the Los Angeles area.69 After receiving numerous dealer com-
62. See Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Levin v. Doctors Hosp. Inc., 233 F. Supp. 953
(D.D.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
63. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
64. Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965).
65. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
67. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
68. Id. at 133-34.
69. Id. at 132.
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plaints, General Motors met with the complaining dealers and de-
veloped a program to stop the sales. This plan included placing
threatening telephone calls to area dealers and informing principal
offenders that sales to discount houses violated their franchise
agreements. 70 The Supreme Court found that General Motors had
not acted unilaterally (i.e., by simply terminating offending deal-
ers), but rather had collaborated with complaining dealers to es-
tablish and enforce the restraint against sales to discount dealers.71
The Court specifically noted that the evidence showed that one of
the purposes of this conspiracy was" to protect the complaining
dealers from price competition.72 After reviewing earlier boycott
cases, the Court concluded: "The principle of these cases is that
where businessmen concert their actions in order to deprive others
of access to merchandise which the latter wish to sell to the public,
we need not inquire into the economic motivation underlying their
conduct. '7 3 The Court found that General Motors' participation in
the boycott was illegal per se.74
The extent to which courts will sometimes go to find concerted
action is illustrated by Nurse Midwifery Associates v. Hibbett.75
The plaintiffs, an obstetrician and an association of nurse-mid-
wives, alleged that several hospitals and physicians conspired to
prevent them from offering physician-supervised nurse-midwifery
services in the Nashville area. The plaintiffs alleged, among other
things, that a physician-sponsored medical malpractice insurer
cancelled the plaintiffs' obstetrician malpractice policy. Plaintiffs
argued that because one of the directors of the insurer was also a
Nashville obstetrician who acted in his own economic interest in
urging cancellation of the policy, the cancellation constituted a
conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The court agreed,
finding that the director's personal stake in the decision was
enough to constitute a conspiracy and denied defendant's motion
70. Id. at 136-37.
71. Id. at 145.
72. Id. at 147.
73. Id. at 146.
74. Id. at 145; see also Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d
478 (5th Cir. 1966) (refusal of television station to accept filmed commercials submitted by
advertising agency constituted furtherance of television station's monopoly, in violation of
antitrust laws). But see Carlson Mach. Tools, Inc. v. American Tool, Inc., 678 F.2d 1253 (5th
Cir. 1982) (manufacturer's negotiations and agreement with a new distributor, prior to
changing distributors, does not of itself violate antitrust laws).
75. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,040 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
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to dismiss."
Based upon these authorities, it is clear that the exclusion of
physicians from an ADS may lead to a group boycott charge if the
ADS is provider controlled or the action is undertaken at the re-
quest of participating providers. To avoid per se treatment of the
decision to exclude certain providers, an ADS should either ap-
point an independent manager or group to handle the selection
process, or sufficiently integrate the practices of the participating
providers to constitute a legitimate joint venture.
Under the first alternative, if the ADS is actually organized as a
single, independent business which is run by a management entity,
it may unilaterally decide not to deal with specific providers for
virtually any reason. The antitrust laws generally permit a single
business enterprise to choose the persons with whom it will deal:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
[the Sherman Act] does not restrict the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.77
Although this doctrine has been sharply restricted over the years,"8
the principle that unilateral refusals to deal do not, without more,
76. See also American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir.
1975); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1974).
In Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), a newspaper distributor charged the de-
fendant newspaper with participation in a conspiracy in restraint of trade. Discussing the
requirement of a combination or conspiracy under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the Supreme
Court suggested that the requisite combination could have been found between the newspa-
per and the distributor's customers, even though the customers did not participate in the
anticompetitive practices directed toward the distributor. Id. at 150 n.6. Under this expan-
sive interpretation, it is possible that the relationship between an ADS and its providers, by
itself, could be claimed to be a combination in restraint of trade. However, subsequent lower
court cases have generally interpreted the Albrecht decision to mean that the members of a
combination must at least have knowledge of the defendant's purpose to restrain trade, and
must themselves intend to restrain trade. Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 581 F.2d
1068, 1074, 1078 (3d Cir. 1978); Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 516 F.
Supp. 1034, 1037-38 (D.D.C. 1981); see also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306
U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939) (court found unlawful conspiracy in pre-Albrecht case where there
was no express agreement, but each party knew others were involved and that cooperation
was essential to carrying out scheme); Glen Eden Hosp. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Mich., 740 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1984).
77. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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constitute antitrust violations, is still very much alive.79
Absent unusual circumstances, an independent management's
unilateral limitations on the number of providers participating in
an ADS should be viewed as procompetitive because such limita-
tions furnish excluded providers with positive incentives to create
competing health plans, thereby stimulating competition among
providers for the plan's business. When such a plan sells a health
care package that includes a designated group of contract provid-
ers, it is not boycotting nonparticipating providers. Although com-
petition implies that some competitors will not get the business,
and in that limited sense are excluded, this exclusion should result
in increased competition at the provider level.10 The antitrust laws
are, after all, designed to protect competition, not the individual
economic well-being of competitors."'
At some point, of course, an ADS could become sufficiently pow-
erful that non-members would be competitively disadvantaged. In
that case, claims of attempted monopolization of essential facilities
might be made."2 Initially, however, as a health plan struggles to
establish itself in the marketplace, a limitation on providers will
likely be necessary to supply sufficient incentive for providers to
join the plan and for other entirely procompetitive purposes.
Blue Cross of Washington & Alaska v. Kitsap Physicians Ser-
79. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1470 (1984); Rus-
sell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) S 65,640, at 69,246 (8th Cir.
1983); Hester v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 659 F.2d 433, 436 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 981 (1982); Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832,
841 (2d Cir. 1980); Consolidated Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Say. Ass'n, 480 F. Supp.
640, 649 (D. Kan. 1979).
80. If an ADS is to be successful in reducing health care costs, it can follow one of two
basic approaches: (1) seek providers known to be cost effective in delivering health care and/
or (2) rely on control mechanisms to eliminate unnecessary services. To restrict an ADS's
ability to choose the providers with whom it deals may eliminate one of the most important
cost saving features of such a health plan. In fact, the Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division recently declared that PPOs should not be overly concerned about excluding physi-
cians or hospitals as participants because the essential feature of a PPO is its selectivity and
the primary competitive risks of a PPO are overinclusiveness rather than exclusion. Thus,
the Antitrust Division stated that the exclusion of some interested providers will likely pro-
mote competition among panels and is a necessary part of the process. McGrath Speech,
supra note 33.
81. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
82. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Glen Eden Hosp., Inc. v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, Inc., 740 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1984). Cf. Official
Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980) (sole publisher of airline schedules
which failed to include connecting flights charged with monopolization), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 917 (1981).
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vice 3 supports this conclusion. There, a Blue Cross plan estab-
lished a closed panel HMO (HealthPlus) with a single physicians'
clinic as the sole provider under the plan. Blue Cross agreed with
the clinic that it would not contract with any other physicians in
the area for its HMO until the clinic had taken all the business it
wanted or was capable of handling. Blue Cross also required its
subscribers to use the medical services of the designated clinic to
the exclusion of all other physicians. Kitsap, an open panel HMO
and the dominant health insurer in the area, alleged that Blue
Cross had engaged in an illegal group boycott of other providers.
The court disagreed:
Here, we have a situation where, on one hand, a health insurer offers
health insurance to prospective subscribers and, on the other, the
insurer contracts with physicians of its choosing to provide medical
services to those who subscribe to the service. Neither relationship
can be characterized as a "boycott." To be sure the unwillingness of
HealthPlus to contract with every physician in the three-county
area excludes some physicians from doing business with it. But this
hardly constitutes a boycott under federal or state antitrust laws.
HealthPlus is free to choose those physicians with whom it will
contract."4
The appointment of an independent management entity proba-
bly offers a significant degree of protection from claims that an
ADS's membership decisions constitute a combination or conspir-
acy of its participating providers. Management should operate au-
tonomously, be independent of providers and, along with the non-
provider Board of Directors, be vested with final authority over all
policy decisions such as membership and pricing. If implemented
unilaterally, virtually any provider mix deemed desirable in the
management's independent business judgment should be permissi-
ble. For example, participating provider status could be granted to
a limited number of physicians or medical groups on a hospital's
staff who account for a minimum number of admissions. If there
are sound business reasons for management's decision, it should be
supportable.8 5 Selection of participating providers also might be
83. 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,589 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
84. Id. at 73,211; see also Hahn v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 508 F. Supp. 970, 975-76 (D.
Or. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3115
(1983).
85. In the absence of business justifications which are reasonable from the ADS's business
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made on the basis of reputations, specialties, or other criteria
which might enhance the attractiveness of the plan to buyers.
Almost any criteria are possible. The key, however, is that pro-
vider membership decisions should be made unilaterally by inde-
pendent ADS management on the basis of sound business justifica-
tions so that, if challenged, any suggestion that the management
bowed to provider pressure can be rebutted.
Under the second alternative, the formation of a joint venture
through partial integration would subject the ADS's membership
decisions to evaluation under the rule of reason. The selection of a
limited provider panel should pass muster under the rule of reason
unless its purpose is to prevent or decrease competition from other
providers, or the ADS contains a sufficiently large percentage of all
physicians in the market area and precludes the formation of com-
peting entities by prohibiting its members from affiliating with an-
other ADS.
For example, the FTC recently approved a joint venture HMO/
IPA plan involving sixty-five percent of the physicians practicing
in the service area, but warned the plan that a requirement that all
IPA members deal exclusively with the IPA might be unlawful be-
cause it would make it extremely difficult for a new or existing
ADS to attract or retain a sufficient physician panel to compete
effectively. 6 Absent these factors, the membership restrictions of
the ADS should be lawful because the general purposes of the ADS
are to expand the business opportunities of the member providers
and to introduce a new competitive entity in the health care field.
Furthermore, excluded providers remain free to pursue other avail-
able business opportunities, such as by competing for the business
of subscribers of traditional insurers or by affiliating with other al-
ternative health care plans. Thus, excluded providers are not de-
prived of essential trade relationships.
perspective, an inference of provider influence over this type of restriction might be over-
whelming. However, the interests of the ADS and providers are not necessarily divergent.
For example, the ADS management might independently conclude that for the efficient op-
eration and marketability of the plan it is necessary to admit doctors who later become
affiliated with other participating medical groups and who will have to provide coverage for
that group's patients.
86. FTC Letter-Frimet, supra note 55; see also FTC Policy Statement, supra note 42, at
48,991. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice also recently commented that it
will closely examine provider-sponsored PPOs which inhibit the freedom of providers to
associate with other health plans. McGrath Speech, supra note 33.
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III. CONCLUSION
The basic message of the Supreme Court's decision in Maricopa
is that the per se rules of antitrust liability apply to joint activities
of competing providers and that the health care industry will not
receive special consideration. Many provider-sponsored or con-
trolled ADSs are legally suspect after Maricopa because they may
be viewed as a combination of otherwise competing, independent
physicians.
In order to avoid price-fixing liability, an ADS has two principal
options. First, it can establish its fee and reimbursement structure
through an independent management entity which would market,
manage and .operate the ADS, or it can retain a consultant for the
specific purpose of setting the fee schedule. The ADS's indepen-
dent management entity should enter into bilateral contracts with
individual participating physicians, and the physicians should not
have access to or review of the fees offered by contracting provid-
ers. The ADS's board of directors should be vested with final au-
thority over policy decisions such as the fee structure and member-
ship and should be composed of non-providers. Participating
providers could still serve on an Advisory Council and comment on
the ADS's reimbursement policy, but the key point is that the
management entity should be independent of the providers and
the providers should not control the fee setting mechanism.
Second, Maricopa suggests that another method of avoiding
price-fixing liability is to partially integrate the practices of the
providers and create a joint venture. A partially integrated health
care plan results when the participating providers centralize some
of their functions, such as marketing, billing and debt collecting,
and enter into a financial arrangement for sharing the risk of loss.
If the ADS can sufficiently integrate the practices of its providers
and arrange for risk-sharing, it should be treated as a joint venture
and thus analyzed under the rule of reason, rather than the per se
rule. Joint ventures are generally found to be lawful under the rule
of reason because they create a new competitive entity and tend to
enhance competition. The fee setting activity of the ADS, when
viewed as a joint venture, should be upheld if it is needed to mar-
ket the plan to third-party payors, the market share of the partici-
pating providers is not substantial, and the providers do not have
the purpose of suppressing competition from other providers.
However, the degree of integration of functions and risk sharing
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ieeded to constitute a joint venture and take the health care plan
out of the per se area remain unclear.
The other area of potential liability for an ADS is a claim by
excluded providers that participating providers engaged in a group
boycott or a concerted refusal to deal with them. Such a claim
could arise if there is provider control of the ADS or the member-
ship decision is made as a result of a request or influence from
participating providers. One way for an ADS to reduce its antitrust
liability is to appoint an independent manager or group to handle
the provider selection process. The ADS's management should op-
erate independently of the providers and use sound business con-
siderations in making its membership decisions. The ADS's refusal
to deal with certain providers can be lawful if it is done unilater-
ally by the ADS management entity and is based upon proper bus-
iness judgments.
Alternatively, the formation of a joint venture through sufficient
integration of functions and sharing of risks should allow the
ADS's membership decisions to be evaluated under the rule of rea-
son. The exclusion of providers from the ADS should be reasonable
unless its purpose is to decrease competition from other providers
or the ADS has substantial market power so that it effectively pre-
vents the formation of competing plans. In the absence of these
factors, the selection of a limited provider panel should be valid
under the rule of reason because an ADS's entry in the market
increases competition and excluded providers are able to join or
form other alternative health care plans.
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